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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report systematically compares over 2,000 South African and non-South African
informal sector entrepreneurs and assesses the similarities and differences between them
in terms of their business operations and their business risks. The two comparison groups
are (i) refugees (holders of Section 24 permits) in Cape Town and Limpopo and (ii) South
African migrants operating businesses in the same localities.
The general literature on informal entrepreneurship conventionally divides participants
into survival (or necessity) entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs. The former are
driven to participate by the need to survive and because they have no other choice. The
latter choose to work in the informal sector because they see opportunities for economic
advancement, they prefer to work for themselves rather than for others, or they feel that
they have the right aptitude. In the South African context, studies of entrepreneurial motivation in the informal sector have sought to go beyond the idea of survivalism and demonstrate that many participants in the informal economy are not driven by desperation
but are highly motivated entrepreneurs. This survey used an entrepreneurial motivation
scale to assess differences, if any, between South Africans and refugees. The ranking of
reasons for starting a business does not differ significantly within each group but there are
important differences between them. Economic survival motivations scored most highly
for both groups, and providing employment or a service to others was the least important.
The highest single factor for both groups was the need to earn more money for basic needs.
Also very important for both was the desire to provide family with greater financial security
and the desire to make more money to remit to family at home. In other words, financial
support of dependants is a strong motivating factor for informal sector entrepreneurship.
In terms of the differences between the two groups of informal sector entrepreneurs,
there were several important findings:
t 4PVUI "GSJDBOT TDPSFE IJHIFS UIBO SFGVHFFT PO POMZ UXP NPUJWBUJPOBM GBDUPST i* XBT
VOFNQMPZFEBOEVOBCMFUPĕOEBKPCwBOEi*IBEBKPCCVUJUEJEOPUQBZFOPVHIwćJT
suggests that for South African migrants, informal sector participation is more closely
tied to the absence of formal employment than it is for refugees. Statistically, refugee
entrepreneurs have about 50% lower odds of starting their business because of being
unable to find a job, which may simply be a reflection of the fact that refugees are shut
out of the formal labour market and do not even try to find employment there.
1
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t 3FGVHFFTXFSFNVDINPSFMJLFMZUPCFNPUJWBUFECZBEFTJSFUPQSPWJEFBTFSWJDFPSQSPEuct to South Africans and to contribute to the development of South Africa. Indeed,
refugees had four times the odds of desiring to contribute to the development of South
Africa than South Africans.
t 3FGVHFFTDPVMEDPVOUPOUIFIFMQBOETVQQPSUPGPUIFSTUPBNVDIHSFBUFSEFHSFFUIBO
South Africans. Refugees had three times the odds of stressing the importance of obtaining help from others in starting their business and going into partnership with others.
t 3FGVHFFTXFSFDPOTJTUFOUMZNPSFQPTJUJWFBCPVUUIFJSQFSTPOBMBQUJUVEFGPSSVOOJOHB
business. On a series of personal attributes associated with entrepreneurship, refugees
had two to three times the odds of having these characteristics.
t 0OBWFSBHF 4PVUI"GSJDBOTIBWFCFFOJOCVTJOFTTGPSMPOHFSUIBOSFGVHFFTXJUIPG
South African and only 2% of refugee businesses established before 2000. In total, 61%
of refugee businesses and 44% of South African businesses were established after 2010.
t 0OMZPG4PVUI"GSJDBOTBOEPGSFGVHFFTXFSFPQFSBUJOHBOJOGPSNBMCVTJOFTT
before migrating. This does not suggest a massive competitive advantage conferred by
prior experience. Over 80% of the refugee entrepreneurs were not operating an informal sector business prior to migrating to South Africa. The stereotypical idea that refuHFFTTPNFIPXIBWFCVTJOFTTiJOUIFJSCMPPEwJTUIFSFGPSFOPUTVQQPSUFECZUIFFWJEFODF
of this survey.
t ćSFFRVBSUFST PG FOUFSQSJTFT SVO CZ CPUI SFGVHFFT BOE 4PVUI "GSJDBO NJHSBOUT BSF
located in the retail sector. However, the two groups tend to occupy and dominate different market niches. South Africans are more strongly represented in food retail. Around
70% of the entrepreneurs selling fresh produce and cooked food were South Africans.
On the other hand, over 70% of those selling most types of personal and household
products were refugees. In the service sector, refugees dominate hair cutting and braiding, as well as car repairs and IT. South Africans tend to dominate shoe repairs, transportation and car washing and guarding.
t 4UBUJTUJDBMMZ UIF4PVUI"GSJDBOFOUSFQSFOFVSTIBEBMNPTUUXJDFUIFPEETPGSVOOJOHB
business established before 2011, almost 10 times the odds of starting a business with
less than ZAR5,000 and almost seven times the odds of currently running a business
valued at less than ZAR5,000, which does suggest that for reasons unrelated to prior
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experience, refugees tend to run higher value businesses and grow them more effectively.
These findings led to a comparative analysis of the business strategies of the two groups
to see whether there were significant differences between them and which contributes more
to the economy. The first point of comparison concerns business location. In the case of
Cape Town, there are areas of the city where each group tends to dominate: refugee businesses are more common in the CBD and Bellville, for instance, while South Africans are
more commonly located along transport routes in and out of the city (such as on streets and
at taxi ranks and bus terminals). Half of the South Africans operate stalls on roadsides and
21% at taxi ranks. This compares with only 31% and 2% of refugees respectively. The other
major difference is that half of the refugees operate from a fixed shop or workshop, compared to only 8% of the South Africans. When compared with the refugee entrepreneurs,
the South African migrant entrepreneurs had greater odds of choosing a business location
based on it having the greatest number of potential customers, tradition, cost of land, and
fewer police in the area. The refugees had higher odds of choosing their business location
based on the other locational factors, especially access to services, property rentals, safety
concerns, and distance from competitors.
Second, refugee entrepreneurs were much more likely than South Africans to rent their
business premises. Almost 60% paid rent to a South African landlord. Another 13% paid
rent to the municipality (as did 10% of the South Africans). Nearly 50% of South Africans
operated their businesses rent free (compared to only 5% of refugees). What this means is
UIBUBSPVOEUISFFRVBSUFSTPG4PVUI"GSJDBOTEPOPUQBZBOZSFOUGPSUIFJSQSFNJTFT XIJMF
over 80% of refugees do. The refugee entrepreneurs also pay a higher monthly rent, on average, than those South Africans who do pay rent (ZAR4,000 per month versus ZAR2,820
per month). In effect, many South Africans are able to augment their household income
through renting business premises to refugees and therefore benefit from their presence.
Third, there is a common assumption that the strategies adopted by refugees give them
a strong competitive advantage over South Africans. The South Africans had higher odds of
adjusting their operating hours according to customer numbers and purchasing insurance.
#PUIIBESPVHIMZFRVBMPEETPGPČFSJOHDSFEJUUPDVTUPNFST)PXFWFS SFGVHFFTIBETJHOJĕcantly higher odds of keeping business records, selling goods more cheaply than competitors, purchasing in bulk with others and negotiating prices with suppliers. The final point
of business strategy comparison concerns hiring practices. Almost half of the refugee entre3
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preneurs have paid employees compared to only 21% of the South Africans. The refugees in
this sample provided three times as many jobs as the South Africans. However, refugee and
South African enterprises create jobs for South Africans at roughly the same rate.
In terms of business risks, the official government stance towards violent attacks on
migrant businesses is that they are the actions of fringe criminal elements. If mere criminalJUZJTUIFQSPCMFN XFNJHIUFYQFDU4PVUI"GSJDBOTPQFSBUJOHJOUIFTBNFBSFBTUPCFFRVBMMZ
affected and some researchers have claimed just that. They argue that the attacks on informal businesses in South Africa are structural in nature, shaped by competition and other
localized factors rather than xenophobia. To them, some combination of criminality and
economic competition explains the violence. This report takes issue with this conclusion,
demonstrating that while South Africans are not immune, refugees are more vulnerable
and that xenophobia needs to be reintroduced as an explanatory factor:
t $PNQBSJOHUIFTFDVSJUZSJTLTPGUIFUXPHSPVQT JUJTDMFBSUIBU4PVUI"GSJDBOTBSFOPU
immune from any of these risks. Nearly a third had been robbed of their stock and
nearly 20% had had income stolen. The degree of vulnerability to other security risks
was much lower. Therefore, while South Africans in the informal sector are also victims
of crime, there is no support for the contention that South Africans and non-South
"GSJDBOTBSFFRVBMMZBUSJTLPSWJDUJNJ[FE
t 0OFWFSZDPVOU UIFQSPQPSUJPOPGSFGVHFFTBČFDUFECZBTFDVSJUZSJTLXBTIJHIFS TPNFtimes significantly so. For example, 21% had been victims of attacks or assaults, compared to 4% of South Africans. Also, 19% had been harassed or extorted by the police,
compared to 6% of South Africans. Some 38% had been victims of theft of income,
compared to 19% of South Africans.
t 4UBUJTUJDBMBOBMZTJTTIPXFEUIBU4PVUI"GSJDBOFOUSFQSFOFVSTIBEMPXFSPEETPGFYQFriencing all potential risks on the list. Refugees were nearly three times as likely to be
victims of theft of income and five times as likely to be subject to demands for bribes
by police. The odds of a refugee entrepreneur being physically assaulted, experiencing
prejudice, and being arrested and detained were over five times higher than for South
Africans.
t *OUIFPSZ XFNJHIUFYQFDUUPTFFIJHIFSEFHSFFTPGJOGPSNBMCVTJOFTTTFDVSJUZSJTLTGPS
both groups in large cities such as Cape Town compared to the much smaller towns of
Limpopo. For both groups, Limpopo was indeed safer than Cape Town. For example,
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56% of refugees and 31% of South Africans had experienced theft of goods in Cape
5PXO*O-JNQPQP UIFFRVJWBMFOUĕHVSFTXFSFBOE BNVDIMPXFSTQSFBEUIBO
in Cape Town. In both locations, however, the risks are significantly higher for refugees
than South Africans. Indeed, refugees in Limpopo were more vulnerable than South
Africans in both Limpopo and Cape Town.
t "OPUIFSDPNNPOCFMJFGJTUIBUTFDVSJUZSJTLTBSFIJHIFSJOJOGPSNBMTFUUMFNFOUTUIBOJO
other parts of the city, particularly as many of the reports of violence against businesses
come from informal settlements, where general crime levels are much higher. For both
refugees and South Africans operating businesses in informal settlements, the security
risks are higher across almost all indicators. However, the difference in the degree of
risk between refugees and South Africans is significantly greater in informal settlements
than it is in formal areas of the city. The only indicator where formal areas are riskier for
both is in the chances of having goods confiscated by the police.
t 3FGVHFFTXFSFGBSNPSFMJLFMZUIBO4PVUI"GSJDBOTUPTBZUIBUUIFJSCVTJOFTTPQFSBUJPOT
had been negatively affected by xenophobia: 38% versus 5%. There are two possible
reasons for South Africans being affected: first, when collective xenophobic violence
occurs at a particular localized settlement, it is possible that some South African-owned
businesses may be caught up in the looting and vandalism. A second explanation is that
there are cascading, spillover effects on South African small businesses with cooperative, dependent relationships and linkages with affected migrant-operated businesses.
This report set out to systematically compare the informal enterprises established by
different categories of migrant in South African urban areas. This comparative analysis of
refugees and internal migrants suggests that there is a need for much greater nuance in policy and academic discussions about the impact of refugee migration on the South African
informal economy. The stereotyping of refugees in public discourse as undermining and
destroying South African competitors is far removed from the reality. While refugees seem
able to access greater amounts of start-up capital (although neither they nor South Africans can access bank loans), both groups seem able to grow their businesses. Partly this is
because they tend to occupy different niches in the informal economy with South Africans
focused on the food sector and refugees on services and retailing household goods. This
may help to explain another difference between the two with refugees tending to patronize
wholesalers for their supplies and South Africans purchasing from supermarkets and fresh
produce markets.
5
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The idea promulgated by government that refugees have a competitive advantage as
in-their-blood entrepreneurs is clearly fallacious. Despite South Africa’s liberal refugee legislation, restrictive employment policies mean that working for, and then establishing, an
informal enterprise is virtually the only available livelihood option. But to argue that refugees come to South Africa with pre-existing skills and business experience is misplaced.
Refugees, like small-business owners everywhere, are extremely motivated and hard-working. They employ several business strategies to achieve monetary success, although expansion is hampered by the need to support dependants in South Africa and the home country,
which limits reinvestment of profits in the business. These strategies are not illegal or even
VOEFSIBOECVURVJUFUSBOTQBSFOUBOEDPVMECFFNVMBUFE
This report shows that the general effect of operating small businesses in the informal
economic sector does make business owners of all kinds vulnerable, but this alone cannot explain the greater vulnerabilities of the refugee cohort. Instead, xenophobia and their
TUBUVTBTiPVUTJEFSTwBEETBOPUIFSMBZFSPGSJTLTGPSTVDIPQFSBUPST-JNJUFEBDDFTTUPQPMJDF
protection and mistreatment by officers only exacerbates this insecurity. Refugees themselves are in no doubt that they are singled out and that it is xenophobia that drives the
violence and harassment they experience.

6
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, South Africa’s Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, made a
public comparison between South African and migrant informal entrepreneurs, echoing
popular misconceptions about both groups. She suggested that South African business
owners were largely inept and should learn from the business practices of their foreign
DPVOUFSQBSUTXIPXFSFiCFUUFSBUSVOOJOHTIPQTUIBOUIFMPDBMPXOFSTw1 At the same time,
South Africans were at a natural disadvantage because they had no history of entrepreneurTIJQćFSFBTPOGPSSFGVHFFTVDDFTT TIFDPOUJOVFE JTUIBUCVTJOFTTiJTJOUIFJSCMPPEy
from the moment they are born, they are introduced to trade. Their mothers, uncles, everyPOFUSBEFTw"TBSFTVMU UIFZiPQFSBUFJOUIFTBNFDPNNVOJUJFTJOXIJDIXFGBJMw2 These
stereotypical comparisons are echoed in the research literature. There is a common idea in
the business literature, for example, that poor black South Africans lack entrepreneurial
ambition and that this helps to explain the relatively small size of the South African informal economy and the high rate of local informal business failure.3
"OPUIFSDPOWFOUJPOBMXJTEPNJTUIBUiTVSWJWBMJTUw4PVUI"GSJDBOTJOUIFJOGPSNBMFDPOPNZBSFCFJOHEJTQMBDFECZiFOUSFQSFOFVSJBMwNJHSBOUT4 South Africans supposedly display
B iTVSWJWBMJTU NFOUBMJUZ BOE POF EJNFOTJPOBM <CVTJOFTT> TUSBUFHZw MFBEJOH UP QPPSFS QFSformance than migrants.5 A comparison of South African and Somali spaza shop owners
in Cape Town found that the latter scored better on various indicators of entrepreneurial orientation including achievement, innovation, personal initiative and autonomy.6 In
addition, migrant businesses grew faster and created more jobs than South African businesses. By contrast, some have suggested that business failure is not inevitable and that
South African survivalists can grow their enterprises and create jobs.7 Other studies have
suggested that the gap between South African and migrant entrepreneurs is not as wide
as is commonly supposed. One study of 500 retail enterprises in Gauteng, for example,
found that motivations to start a business did not differ significantly between South Africans and immigrants.8 A study of street traders in inner-city Johannesburg concluded that
South Africans were actually more innovative than migrants, although they did not display
the same levels of proactiveness and competitive aggression.9 While migrant traders had
earned more than their South African counterparts in 2008 and 2010, in 2009 the South
Africans were the higher earners.10

7

comparing refugees and south africans in the urban informal sector

The sustainability of all informal enterprises is shaped by the challenges they encounter
and the manner in which they are able to manage business risks effectively. A sizeable body
of research has shown that all small enterprises in the South African informal economy face
significant business obstacles, preventing them from maximizing their potential.11 These
business risks include limited trading spaces; lack of access to loans from formal financial institutions; few technical, financial and business-related skills; excessive licensing or
regulatory restrictions on business operations; lack of a well-defined policy framework for
operating; intense competition with other similar businesses; and lack of infrastructure
TVDIBTBEFRVBUFTUPSBHFGBDJMJUJFT12
In South Africa, business risks are compounded by security risks because of the unpredictable and often dangerous operating environment. These security risks are of several
main types. In many cities, the informal economy is regarded with suspicion and even
outright hostility by municipalities, and seen as a reservoir of crime and illegality.13 The
resulting oppressive regulatory environment is enforced by the South African Police Services (SAPS) and municipal police who make regular raids, issue fines, and confiscate
goods.14 Harassment by police and enforcement officials is compounded by police misconduct including demands for bribes and illegal confiscation of business inventory and stock.
Informal businesses are regular targets of national (Operation Fiela), provincial (Operation Hardstick in Limpopo) and city-wide (Operation Cleansweep in Johannesburg) police
purges of the streets and large-scale seizure of stock. The courts have generally concluded
that these operations are largely targeted at the foreign-owned businesses. A 2014 Supreme
$PVSUKVEHNFOUTUSJLJOHEPXO0QFSBUJPO)BSETUJDL GPSFYBNQMF MFęUIFDPVSUXJUIiUIF
uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza
shops and tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave
our shores.”15 The obverse of police misconduct is a failure to provide consistent protection
when businesses are under threat or are victims of crime and other violence.
Many informal businesses service the basic needs of low-income, crime-ridden communities. This means that, by definition, they are vulnerable to opportunistic and often
violent crime in the form of theft, robbery and assault. There is also a clear pattern of escalating mob violence in many parts of the country which is increasingly directed at informal
businesses.16 Nationwide mob violence and looting in May 2008 and early 2015 were the
most high-profile examples but in the years between and since there have been numerous
more localized attacks. These assaults generally involve widespread looting, destruction
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and burning of property, and physical assault and murder. There is considerable evidence
that this form of violence is targeted almost exclusively at foreign-owned businesses and
cannot therefore be easily dismissed as non-xenophobic.
The official government stance towards xenophobic attacks has shifted from a lack of
acknowledgement of xenophobia’s presence to public denial of its very existence in the
country.17 Instead, the attacks are consistently written off as the actions of fringe criminal
elements. If mere criminality is the source of the plague of chronic violence against nonSouth African entrepreneurs, however, we might expect South Africans operating in the
TBNF BSFBT UP CF FRVBMMZ BČFDUFE 4PNF SFTFBSDIFST DMBJN UIBU UIJT JT JOEFFE UIF DBTF18
They argue that the attacks on informal businesses in South Africa are structural in nature,
shaped by competition and localized factors other than nationality or xenophobia. One
TUVEZPG%FMęJO$BQF5PXONBJOUBJOTUIBUiEFTQJUFBSFDFOUIJTUPSZPGJOUFOTFFDPOPNJD
competition in the spaza market in which foreign shopkeepers have come to dominate, levFMTPGWJPMFOUDSJNFBHBJOTUGPSFJHOTIPQLFFQFSTyBSFOPUTJHOJĕDBOUMZIJHIFSUIBOBHBJOTU
South African shopkeepers.”19 They conclude that there is no need to invoke xenophobia to
FYQMBJOWJPMFODFBHBJOTUOPO4PVUI"GSJDBOJOGPSNBMFOUFSQSJTFT3BUIFS iTPNFDPNCJOBtion of criminality and economic competition seems to explain the violence.”20
A larger study by the same authors examines patterns of violence in three cities and conDMVEFTUIBUiJUTJNQMZJTOPUUSVFUIBUy4PVUI"GSJDBOTIPQLFFQFSTFYQFSJFODFMFTTWJPMFOU
DSJNFUIBOGPSFJHOTIPQLFFQFSTwBOEUIFSFGPSFUIBUiUIFDIBODFPGCFJOHWJPMFOUMZUBSHFUFE
is less about nationality, and more about whether you keep prices low and (presumably)
profits high.”21ćFRVFTUJPOUPCFBEESFTTFEJTXIFUIFSUIFTFTFDVSJUZSJTLToHPWFSONFOU
QVSHFT QPMJDFNJTDPOEVDU PQQPSUVOJTUJDDSJNFBOENPCWJPMFODFoBČFDU4PVUI"GSJDBOT
BOEOPO4PVUI"GSJDBOJOGPSNBMCVTJOFTTFTXJUIFRVBMJOUFOTJUZ*GXFBDDFQUUIFBSHVNFOU
that xenophobia is not a factor, then we would expect there to be no difference between
UIF GSFRVFODZ BOE TFWFSJUZ XJUI XIJDI UIF UXP HSPVQT BSF BČFDUFE *G  IPXFWFS  UIFSF JT
systematic evidence that these attacks are experienced more severely by non-South African migrant informal business owners, then xenophobia needs to be reintroduced as an
explanatory factor.

9
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METHODOLOGY
This report systematically compares a group of South African and non-South African informal sector entrepreneurs and assesses the similarities and differences between them, both
in terms of their business operations and their business risks. The two comparison groups
are (i) refugees (holders of Section 24 permits) in Cape Town and Limpopo and (ii) South
African migrants operating businesses in the same localities. Without a census or register
of informal sector businesses to create a sampling frame, an alternative strategy was used
to ensure a degree of representativeness of the samples. Two procedures were adopted: (a)
maximum variation sampling (MVS) to identify a sub-set of areas within the city (in the
case of Cape Town and a sub-set of towns in Limpopo) in which to conduct the research;
and (b) random sampling of the population within the selected research sites. MVS is based
on the principle of maximum diversity, an extension of the statistical principle of regression
UPXBSETUIFNFBOXIFSFJOTUFBEPGTFFLJOHSFQSFTFOUBUJWFOFTTUISPVHIFRVBMQSPCBCJMJUZJU
is sought by including a broad range of extremes. The precise application of MVS follows
that used in a study of the informal sector in Bangalore, India.22
Five different types of area in Cape Town were selected: commercial, formal residential, informal residential, mixed formal and informal residential, and industrial. Within
each of these types, contrasting and geographically separated research sites were selected in
the commercial (two sites), industrial (two sites), formal residential (three sites) informal
settlements (three sites) and mixed formal and informal residential (two sites). In the case
PG-JNQPQP UIFQSJNBSZDSJUFSJPOGPSUIFBQQMJDBUJPOPGiNBYJNVNWBSJBUJPOTBNQMJOHw
was urban size. Six towns, covering a wide size range and scattered around the province,
were selected. In each research site, the same systematic sampling approach was adopted.
This approach is feasible because the survey was conducted in urban areas where houses
and businesses are located along streets. Sampling was therefore conducted along street
lines in each site, the mapped grid-pattern exhibited by streets was utilized, sampling one
street after the other in successive fashion moving from west to east. After identifying the
first five enterprises on a street, and randomly selecting the first of the five for the sample,
every third enterprise was selected thereafter. Provided the enterprise was owned by a local
(a South African migrant defined as someone born outside the city or province) or somePOFXJUISFGVHFFTUBUVT 4FDUJPO UIFFOUFSQSJTFRVBMJĕFEGPSJODMVTJPOJOUIFTUVEZćF
process was repeated in each survey site. Where business owners were not available for
interview, field workers made three call backs to the enterprise, after which a substitution
10
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was made. The number of refugee and South African entrepreneurs interviewed in each site
is shown in Tables 1 and 2.
TABLE 1: Location of Interviews in Cape Town

Refugees
Bellville

South Africans

91

84

CBD

103

88

Delft

26

43

Imizamo Yethu

34

18

Khayelitsha

25

23

Maitland

40

10

Masiphumelele

10

34

Parow

82

24

Philippi

21

42

Dunoon

42

93

Nyanga

3

31

27

12

504

502

Observatory
Total surveyed
TABLE 2: Location of Interviews in Limpopo

Refugees

South Africans

Polokwane

159

166

Musina

121

74

Louis Trichardt

36

51

Thohoyandou

59

57

Burgersfort

96

41

Tzaneen

33

177

504

566

Total surveyed

In total, the survey drew a sample of 1,068 South African entrepreneurs and 1,008 refugee entrepreneurs. For the purposes of this comparative analysis, the report combines the
two sub-groups of refugees (in Cape Town and Limpopo) into one group and does the same
with the South Africans.
11
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COMPARING ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTIVATION
South Africans and refugees appear to face very different livelihood prospects in the country’s urban areas. Although South Africa does not have a refugee encampment policy and
refugees are permitted, by law, to pursue employment, there is much evidence to suggest
that they face considerable barriers in accessing the formal labour market.23 They have been
shut out of the security industry (where many were initially employed) and face substantial hurdles in getting employers to accept their documentation. South Africans, on the
other hand, should theoretically have none of these problems but they face other barriers
including limited skills and training, and high rates of unemployment (currently around
30% nationally and as high as 45% amongst urban youth).24 South African migrants to the
cities often end up living in informal settlements far from formal job opportunities and also
have to compete in the job market with long-time residents of the city who have a significant geographical and networking advantage. For both sets of migrants, then, the informal
economy is often the only livelihood niche they can find.
The general literature on informal entrepreneurship conventionally divides participants
into survival (or necessity) entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs.25 The former are
driven to participate by the need to survive and because they have no other choice. The
latter choose to work in the informal sector because they see opportunities for economic
advancement, or they prefer to work for themselves rather than for others, or they feel that
they have the right aptitude. Distinguishing between these two types of entrepreneur and
their likely differences in entrepreneurial motivation and orientation has generated a large
empirical and methodological literature. In the South African context, studies of entrepreneurial motivation have sought to go beyond the idea of survivalism and demonstrate that
many participants in the informal economy are not driven there out of desperation but are
highly motivated entrepreneurs.26
One of the most common ways of deciding what lies behind personal decisions to
establish an informal enterprise is to measure entrepreneurial motivation. This involves
the development of possible reasons why the informal enterprise was started and then asking respondents to rank them on a Likert scale from 1 (no importance) to 5 (extremely
important). Both refugees and South African migrants were presented with 24 possibilities
to rate. A mean score was calculated for each group on each statement (Table 3). For ease
of interpretation, we have grouped the 24 statements under four main themes (a) economic survival; (b) provision of employment or a service to others; (c) business experience
12
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and appeal; and (d) entrepreneurial orientation. Two things immediately stand out from a
descriptive comparison of means. First, both refugees and migrants tend to assign the same
relative importance to each of the 24 factors, which might suggest that they have a similar
motivational profile. The second notable finding is that almost across the board, even on
statements that had a low mean score, refugees’ scores were higher than South African
migrants. This could indicate a greater general degree of commitment to participation in
the informal economy amongst refugees.

TABLE 3: Entrepreneurial Motivation of Refugees and South Africans

South
Africans
(mean
score)

Refugees
(mean
score)

I needed more money just to survive

4.10

4.31

I wanted to give my family greater financial security

3.69

3.97

I was unemployed and unable to find a job

3.43

2.89

I wanted to make more money to send to my family in my home area/country

3.00

3.57

I had a job but it did not pay enough

2.29

2.24

I had a job but it did not suit my qualifications and experience

1.44

1.62

I wanted to provide a product/service to South Africans

2.74

3.41

I wanted to contribute to the development of South Africa

2.69

3.35

I wanted to provide a service/product to non-South Africans/migrants and refugees

2.46

3.00

I wanted to provide employment for people from my home area/country

1.93

2.25

I wanted to provide employment for members of my family

2.19

2.27

I wanted to provide employment for other South Africans

2.10

2.29

I wanted more control over my own time/to be my own boss

3.08

3.72

I have always wanted to run my own business

3.06

3.75

Support and help in starting my business was available from other South Africans/refugees

2.05

3.03

I decided to go into business in partnership with others

1.62

2.37

My family has always been involved in business

1.81

2.34

Economic survival/financial support of dependants

Providing employment/product/service

Business experience/appeal
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Entrepreneurial orientation
I have the right personality to run my own business

3.01

3.45

I wanted to do something new and challenging

2.83

3.34

I like to learn new skills

2.83

3.41

I enjoy taking risks

2.73

3.24

I like to challenge myself

2.84

3.37

I wanted to increase my status in the community

2.48

2.99

I wanted to compete with others and be the best

2.48

3.07

ćFPOMZUXPGBDUPSTPOXIJDI4PVUI"GSJDBOTTDPSFEIJHIFSUIBOSFGVHFFTXFSFi*XBT
VOFNQMPZFEBOEVOBCMFUPĕOEBKPCwBOEi*IBEBKPCCVUJUEJEOPUQBZFOPVHIwćJTTVHgests that for South African migrants, informal sector participation is more closely tied to
the absence of formal employment than it is for refugees. Of the four groups of factors, economic survival motivations scored most highly for both groups, and providing an employment or service was the least important. The highest single factor for both groups was the
need for more money to survive (both with means over 4.0). Also very important for both
was the desire to provide family with greater financial security and the desire to make more
money to remit to family at home. In other words, financial support of dependants is a
strong motivating factor for informal sector entrepreneurship. Neither group was highly
motivated by a desire to provide employment for others but refugees were much more likely
to be motivated by a desire to provide a service or product to South Africans (3.41 versus
2.74) and to contribute to the development of South Africa (3.35 versus 2.69).
Although both groups said that wanting to run their own business and be their own
boss was important to them, the refugees scored significantly higher on both factors. One
of the major differences between the two was the amount of help and support they could
count on from others, with refugees scoring much higher than South Africans (3.03 versus
2.05). Refugees were also consistently more positive about their personal aptitude for running a business. This is clear in the grouping of entrepreneurial orientation factors where
refugees scored above 3.0 on six of the seven factors compared to South Africans who
scored above 3.0 on only one.
8IJMFUIFTFGSFRVFODZEJTUSJCVUJPOTUFMMBOJOUFSFTUJOHTUPSZBCPVUUIFEJČFSFODFTBOE
similarities between South African migrant and refugee entrepreneurs, it is difficult to
gauge their statistical significance. The main challenge is that the dependent variable for
14
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the comparison (the importance ranking for each variable) is at an ordinal level of measurement with varying distributions across each sampled group. This means that we need
to use non-parametric tests of difference and bin the motivation factors into binary level
indicators. Each indicator was therefore assigned two values: not important (1 in the original scale) and important (2-5 in the original scale). A combination of odds ratio calculaUJPOTBOE1FBSTPOTDIJTRVBSFUFTUPGJOEFQFOEFODFXFSFVTFEUPUFTUGPSTJHOJĕDBODFćF
odds ratio calculations show how migrant status is associated with a change in the odds of
ranking each motivation factor (where a value greater than 1 indicates increased odds and
less than 1 indicates decreased odds). These calculations are supported by 95% confidence
JOUFSWBMTBOEUIFQWBMVFTUBLFOGSPNBDIJTRVBSFBOBMZTJT XIFSFBOBMQIBPGJTVTFE
as a threshold for a statistically significant difference in the distribution of scores across the
two groups) (Table 4).

TABLE 4: Odds Ratio Calculations of Motivational Factors

Entrepreneurial motivation factor

Odds
ratio

95% confidence
interval
Lower

Upper

Pearson
chisquare

Df

P-value
(2-sided)

I was unemployed and unable to find a job**

0.496

0.411

0.599

54.036

1

<.001

I had a job but it did not pay enough

1.012

0.851

1.204

.019

1

0.895

I had a job but it did not suit my qualifications and
experience**

1.631

1.322

2.012

21.088

1

<.001

I wanted to provide employment for members of my
family**

1.344

1.128

1.600

10.970

1

0.001

I wanted to provide employment for people from my
home area/country**

1.840

1.540

2.198

45.499

1

<.001

I wanted to provide employment for other South
Africans**

1.597

1.341

1.902

27.682

1

<.001

I needed more money just to survive**

1.770

1.275

2.457

11.880

1

0.001

1.651

1.294

2.105

16.483a

1

<.001

I wanted to make more money to send to my family
in my home area/country**

2.942

2.393

3.618

109.114a

1

<.001

I decided to go into business in partnership with
others**

2.931

2.423

3.545

126.855

1

<.001

I wanted to give my family greater financial
security**
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Support and help in starting my business was
available from other South Africans/refugees**

3.155

2.635

3.778

160.774

1

<.001

My family has always been involved in business**

2.149

1.793

2.575

69.422a

1

<.001

2.085

1.741

2.496

64.788

1

<.001

I wanted to provide a product/service to South
Africans**

2.550

2.103

3.093

92.934

1

<.001

I have always wanted to run my own business**

2.806

2.268

3.471

94.245

1

<.001

2.176

1.787

2.650

61.018

1

<.001

I wanted to do something new and challenging**

2.289

1.890

2.772

73.209

1

<.001

I like to learn new skills**

2.590

2.128

3.153

92.620

1

<.001

I enjoy taking risks**

2.299

1.901

2.781

75.044

1

<.001

I like to challenge myself**

2.466

2.028

2.998

83.975

1

<.001

I wanted more control over my own time/to be my
own boss**

2.887

2.331

3.574

98.785

1

<.001

I wanted to increase my status in the community**

2.193

1.832

2.626

74.095

1

<.001

I wanted to compete with others and be the best**

2.581

2.151

3.096

106.434

1

<.001

I wanted to contribute to the development of South
Africa**

3.677

3.001

4.505

166.788

1

<.001

I wanted to provide a service/product to non-South
Africans/migrants and refugees**

I have the right personality to run my own
business**

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from South African to refugee entrepreneurs

The major conclusions from the analysis are as follows: first, refugee entrepreneurs had
about 50% lower odds of starting their business because of being unable to find a job. Second, refugees had almost four times the odds of desiring to contribute to the development
of South Africa and three times the odds of stressing the importance of obtaining help from
others in starting their business and going into partnership with others. Third, refugees had
nearly three time the odds of starting a business with the intention of remitting money to
family at home. Finally, refugees had two to three times the odds of assigning importance
to the range of personal entrepreneurial orientation factors.
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CONTRASTING BUSINESS PROFILES
The survey highlighted a number of similarities and differences in the informal business
activities of refugee and South African migrant enterprises. First, more South Africans had
been in business for a longer period of time (Table 5 and Figure 1). For example, 19% of the
South African businesses were established before 2000, compared to only 2% of the refugee
businesses. However, the majority of all businesses were started in the past decade with
61% of refugee businesses and 44% of South African businesses established after 2010. This
finding is certainly consistent with the general perception that refugees have been entering
the informal economy in growing numbers.
TABLE 5: Year of Business Establishment

South Africans

Year

Refugees

No.

%

<= 1990

46

4.4

1

0.1

1991-1995

49

4.7

1

0.1

1996-2000

115

11.0

18

1.8

2001-2005

124

11.9

70

7.1

2006-2010

246

23.6

293

29.6

2011-2016

462

44.3

608

61.4

1,042

100.0

991

100.0

Total

No.

%

FIGURE 1: Year of Business Establishment
70

Percentage
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0

Before or in 1990
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Year of business establishment
South Africans
Refugees
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Second, since both groups are migrants to the city, it is important to see if they go into
business as soon as they arrive or if business start-up comes later. Only 32% of refugees and
21% of South Africans started a business within the first year of arrival (Table 6). This general pattern of a greater time lapse on the part of the South Africans is further demonstrated
by the fact that 41% of them started their business within two years of arrival, compared to
61% of the refugees. Both groups have similar numbers who waited three to 10 years but
starting a business after 10 years or more was definitely a South African preserve (at 24%
compared to 3% of refugees). The general time lapse in both groups indicates that immediate start-up is not an option for most. Both tend to work first in the formal or informal
economy, often to raise the start-up capital to branch out on their own.
TABLE 6: Time Lapse Between Year of Migration and Business Start-Up

Years

South Africans

Refugees

No.

%

No.

%

0

213

21.4

304

32.0

1-2

196

19.7

277

29.2

3-5

173

17.4

201

21.2

6-10

172

17.3

140

14.7

>10

242

24.3

28

2.9

Third, it is theoretically possible that the shorter time-lag between migration and startup amongst refugees is also because they have prior business experience. The respondents
were all asked what their main occupation was prior to leaving their home country or area.
Only 9% of the South Africans said that they were operating their own informal sector
business. The figure for refugees was higher, at 18%, but this does not suggest a massive
competitive advantage conferred by prior experience. More than 80% of the refugee entrepreneurs were not operating an informal sector business before migrating to South Africa.
ćFTUFSFPUZQJDBMJEFBUIBUSFGVHFFTTPNFIPXIBWFCVTJOFTTiJOUIFJSCMPPEwJTUIFSFGPSFOPU
supported by the evidence of this survey.
Fourth, the survey found that the majority of enterprises of both refugees and South
African migrants are located in the retail sector (Table 7). A small number of businesses
(9% of refugees and 6% of South Africans) are involved in more than one sector; for example, a business that manufactured and sold arts and crafts would count as both a retail and
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manufacturing enterprise. Or a business offering a service, such as a hair salon, may also
be involved in selling products. At this sectoral level of analysis, it appears that there is
potential for significant intra-sectoral competition between the two groups. However, if the
activity profile is disaggregated, the picture is more nuanced (Table 8).

TABLE 7: Sectors of Informal Business Operation

South Africans

Sector

Refugees

No.

%

No.

%

Retail, trade and wholesale

828

77.5

778

77.2

Services

262

24.5

271

26.9

41

3.8

60

6.0

4

0.4

2

0.2

Manufacturing
Other
Note: Multiple response question

TABLE 8: Main Goods and Services Provided

% of total
enterprises
owned by South
Africans

% of total
enterprises
owned by
refugees

% of South
African
enterprises
selling product
or service

% of refugee
enterprises
selling product
or service

Fruit and vegetables

27.1

13.4

68.2

31.8

Cooked food (ready to eat)

18.4

6.7

74.3

25.7

Confectionary

17.5

17.0

52.2

47.8

Cool drinks/pop/canned drinks

13.1

22.3

38.4

61.6

Livestock (e.g. chickens)

1.7

0.2

90.0

10.0

Alcohol

0.9

0.4

71.4

28.6

13.3

19.9

40.8

59.2

Clothing and footwear

7.7

19.5

29.4

70.6

Accessories (bags, sunglasses)

6.1

16.5

28.1

71.9

Toiletries and cosmetics

3.9

14.8

22.0

78.0

Retail
Food and beverages

Personal and household goods
Cigarettes
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Household products

3.4

9.3

27.7

72.3

Electronics

1.8

7.5

20.0

80.0

CDs/DVDs

1.1

2.6

31.6

68.4

Books/newspapers

0.7

2.9

19.4

80.6

Arts and crafts

1.1

2.6

31.6

68.4

Hardware/tools

1.1

2.2

35.3

64.7

Car parts

0.5

0.5

50.0

50.0

15.3

14.2

53.2

46.8

Haircutting and braiding

6.4

15.1

30.9

69.1

Car washing

3.4

0.4

90.0

10.0

Car parking/guarding

2.3

0.0

100.0

0.0

Shoe repairs

2.0

0.7

75.0

25.0

Car repairs

1.2

0.5

27.8

72.2

Telephone

1.2

1.6

44.8

55.2

IT/internet

0.9

2.7

27.0

73.0

Transportation (taxi/passengers)

0.5

0.2

71.4

0.2

Rentals

0.4

0.1

80.0

20.0

Financial (loans)

0.3

0.1

75.0

25.0

Accommodation

0.2

0.2

50.0

50.0

Construction (building)

0.2

0.0

100.0

0.0

Traditional doctor

0.2

0.2

50.0

50.0

Transportation (goods)

0.2

0.1

66.6

33.4

Medicine (pharmacy)

0.1

0.1

50.0

50.0

Other

5.3

5.6

50.4

49.6

Sewing/tailoring

1.7

2.0

47.4

52.6

Arts and crafts

0.7

0.4

66.6

33.4

Shoe repair

0.5

0.5

50.0

50.0

Furniture making

0.4

0.6

40.0

60.0

Security (gates and burglar bars)

0.1

0.4

20.0

80.0

Waste recycling

0.0

0.1

0.0

100.0

Other

0.6

1.9

24.0

76.0

Other goods

Other
Services

Manufacturing

Note: Multiple response question
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Table 8 shows that at least some South Africans and refugees are involved in every activity. However, the two groups also tend to occupy and dominate different market niches.
South Africans are more strongly represented in food retail (the main exception being conGFDUJPOBSZBOEUIFTBMFPGDBOOFEESJOLTXJUISPVHIMZFRVBMQBSUJDJQBUJPO "SPVOEPG
the entrepreneurs who were selling fresh produce and cooked food were South Africans.
On the other hand, over 70% of those selling most types of personal and household products were refugees. In the service sector, refugees dominate haircutting and braiding, as
well as car repairs and IT. South Africans tend to dominate shoe repairs, transportation
and car washing and guarding. There is less differentiation in the manufacturing sector,
although the overall number of participants is small compared with retail and services.
Fourth, there was a significant difference in the amount of start-capital used by the
two groups (Figure 2). Almost 80% of the South Africans started their businesses with less
UIBO;"3  XIJMFUIFFRVJWBMFOUĕHVSFXBTPOMZGPSSFGVHFFT"UUIFPUIFSFOEPG
the spectrum, only 6% of the South Africans had start-up capital of more than ZAR20,000
compared to 43% of the refugees. This certainly suggests that refugees have access to greater
amounts of start-up capital but it may also be that the barriers to entry are much lower in
the food sector (which is dominated by South Africans) as the initial spend on stock is likely
to be much lower than for businesses selling personal and household goods. It is significant
that of the 28% of refugees who started with less than ZAR5,000, most were food retailers.
FIGURE 2: Amount of Start-Up Capital
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Fifth, both groups had added value to their businesses since start-up (Table 9). For example, while 78% of South Africans started with less than ZAR5,000, only 40% valued their
FOUFSQSJTFBTTUJMMMFTTUIBO;"3  BGBMMPG 4JNJMBSMZ XJUISFGVHFFTUIFFRVJWBMFOU
figures were 28% and 9% (a fall of 19%). The proportion of South African businesses with a
current value of over ZAR20,000 was 25% (compared to only 6% at start-up). In the case of
SFGVHFFT UIFFRVJWBMFOUĕHVSFTXFSFBOE*OPUIFSXPSET PG4PVUI"GSJDBOT
and 27% of refugees had moved into the highest value bracket.
TABLE 9: Current Business Value

South Africans

Refugees

No.

%

No.

%

Less than ZAR5,000

349

40.1

75

8.5

ZAR5,000-9,999

177

20.3

83

9.4

ZAR10,000-19,999

128

14.7

110

12.4

ZAR20,000-29,999

57

6.6

110

12.4

ZAR30,000-49,999

59

6.8

115

13.0

ZAR50,000-99,999

46

5.3

148

16.7

ZAR100,000-199,999

28

3.2

135

15.2

ZAR200,000-499,999

18

2.1

93

10.5

ZAR500,000-999,999

3

0.3

12

1.4

<=ZAR1,000,000

5

0.6

5

0.6

870

100.0

886

100.0

Total

To assess the statistical significance of these differences, key variable comparisons were
ESBXOPVUGSPNUIFGSFRVFODZEJTUSJCVUJPOTBOECJOOFEJOUPCJOBSZMFWFMWBSJBCMFTćFTF
included (a) year of establishment (<=2010 and >2010); (b) start-up capital (<ZAR5,000
and >ZAR5,000); and (c) current business value (<ZAR5,000 and >ZAR5,000). The odds
ratio calculations performed in Table 10 provide convergent validity for the observed freRVFODZEJTUSJCVUJPOT*OEFQFOEFOUPGUIFJOĘVFODFPGBOZPUIFSWBSJBCMFT UIF4PVUI"GSJcan entrepreneurs had almost twice the odds of running a business established before 2011,
almost 10 times the odds of starting a business with less than ZAR5,000 and almost seven
times the odds of running a business currently valued at less than ZAR5,000. All of these
DPNQBSJTPOTZJFMEFEQWBMVFTMFTTUIBOUIFBMQIBPGPOCPUIUIF1FBSTPOTDIJTRVBSF
test and the Fisher’s exact test.
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TABLE 10: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Characteristics

95% C.I.
Variables

Odds ratio

P-values

Lower

Upper

Chi-square

Fisher’s
exact test

Established business before 2011**

1.993

1.67

2.379

<.001

<.001

Less than ZAR5,000 in start-up amount**

9.579

7.772

11.807

<.001

<.001

Less than ZAR5,000 in current value **

7.243

5.515

9.514

<.001

<.001

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs

BUSINESS STRATEGIES
Given the official and business literature perception that non-South Africans are much better at running businesses than their South African counterparts, it is important to find out
whether the two groups pursue different business strategies and activities. The first point
of comparison concerns where the two groups choose to locate their business operations.
In the case of Cape Town, there are areas of the city where each group tends to dominate:
refugee businesses are more common in the CBD and Bellville, for instance, while South
Africans are more commonly located along transport routes in and out of the city, such as
on streets and at taxi ranks and bus terminals. This difference is clear from Table 11. Half
of the South Africans operate stalls on roadsides and 21% at taxi ranks. This compares with
only 31% and 2% of refugees respectively. The other major difference is that half of the refugees operate from a fixed shop or workshop, compared to only 8% of the South Africans.
In addition to the observed variations in business location, the reasons for locational
decisions also varied between the two groups (Table 12). When compared with the refugees, the South African migrant entrepreneurs had higher odds of choosing a business
location based on it having the greatest number of customers, the tradition of doing business in a location, the cheapness of land, and the limited number of police in the area. The
refugees had higher odds of choosing their business location based on other locational
factors, especially access to services, property rentals, safety concerns, and distance from
competitors.
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TABLE 11: Usual Location of Business Activities

Business location

South Africans

Refugees

No.

%

No.

%

Temporary stall on the street/roadside

290

27.2

166

16.5

Permanent stall on the street/roadside

246

23.0

147

14.6

Taxi rank

221

20.7

22

2.2

In my home

102

9.6

34

3.4

No fixed location, mobile

87

8.1

26

2.6

Workshop or shop

86

8.1

525

52.1

Permanent stall in a market

87

8.1

106

10.5

Bus terminal

52

4.9

9

0.9

Railway station

21

2.0

1

0.1

Vehicle (car, truck, motor bike, bike)

19

1.8

3

0.3

In customer’s home

16

1.5

16

1.6

Craft market

6

0.6

7

0.7

Restaurant or hotel

2

0.2

8

0.8

37

3.5

38

3.8

Other
Note: Multiple response question

TABLE 12: Odds Ratio Calculations of Reasons for Business Location

95% C.I. for O.R.
Reasons

Odds ratio

P-values

Lower

Upper

Chi-square

Fisher’s
exact test

Place with greatest number of customers**

2.231

1.707

2.915

<.001

<.001

Access to services such as water/electricity**

0.341

0.284

0.409

<.001

<.001

Have a permit to operate there**

0.746

0.624

0.893

.001

.001

Rents are cheaper

0.969

0.807

1.163

0.732

0.744

Safer than other locations**

0.673

0.564

0.803

<.001

<.001

Due to passing traffic

0.949

0.775

1.163

0.615

0.641

Close to home

0.869

0.73

1.036

0.117

0.118

Own/rent the land**

0.458

0.381

0.55

<.001

<.001

Close to other enterprises*

0.825

0.692

0.984

0.032

0.035

Distant from other competitors**

0.647

0.534

0.784

<.001

<.001
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Always done business there**

1.262

1.061

1.501

0.009

0.009

Close to public transport

0.987

0.811

1.2

0.893

0.92

Cheap land**

1.739

1.424

2.123

<.001

<.001

Few or no police*

1.251

1.017

1.54

0.034

0.035

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs

Refugee entrepreneurs were much more likely than South Africans to rent their business premises (Table 13). Almost 60% paid rent to a South African landlord. Another 13%
paid rent to the municipality (as did 10% of the South Africans). Nearly 50% of South Africans operated their businesses rent free, compared to only 5% of refugees. What this means,
JOFČFDU JTUIBUBSPVOEUISFFRVBSUFSTPG4PVUI"GSJDBOTEPOPUQBZBOZSFOUGPSUIFJSQSFNises, while over 80% of refugees do. The refugee entrepreneurs also pay a higher monthly
rent, on average, than those South Africans who do pay rent (ZAR4,000 per month versus
ZAR2,820 per month). In effect, many South Africans are able to augment their household income through renting business premises to refugees and therefore benefit from their
presence.
TABLE 13: Occupancy/Tenure Status of Business Premises

Tenure status

South Africans

Refugees

No.

%

No.

%

Rent-free, with permission

276

26.1

58

5.8

I own it/am part owner

256

24.2

48

4.8

Rent-free, without permission (squatting)

214

20.3

59

5.9

Pay rent to private owner who is a South African (company or individual)

145

13.7

595

59.7

Pay rent to council/municipality

104

9.8

126

12.7

Share space/premises with others

28

2.7

2

0.2

Pay rent to private owner who is not a South African (company or individual)

17

1.6

91

9.1

Other

16

1.5

17

1.7

Another area of business strategy comparison concerns where the two groups source
their goods and whether they tend to patronize the same outlets (Table 14). Most of the
respondent refugees buy their supplies at wholesalers while South Africans patronize
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XIPMFTBMFSTBOETVQFSNBSLFUTJOBMNPTUFRVBMOVNCFST4PVUI"GSJDBOSFTQPOEFOUTBMTP
obtain goods from fresh produce markets and directly from farms in greater numbers. With
the exception of factory purchase, refugees tend to spend more on average at all outlets.
For example, while fewer refugees patronize supermarkets, their average monthly spend is
ZAR8,693 compared with only ZAR3,219 by the South Africans. In total, the South African
respondents spend more than the refugees at supermarkets, at fresh produce markets and
directly from farms. Refugees spend five times as much on average at wholesalers and far
more in total (ZAR21 million compared to less than ZAR2 million).
TABLE 14: Patronage of Different Suppliers

South Africans

Refugees

% using
source

Mean
monthly
spend
(ZAR)

Total
annual
spend
(ZAR)

% using
source

Mean
monthly
spend
(ZAR)

Total annual
spend (ZAR)

Wholesaler

27.8

6,248

1,855,724

61.0

34,728

21,357,827

Supermarkets

27.3

3,219

936,642

8.5

8,693

747,640

Small shops/retailers

11.4

1,798

219,407

11.0

6,282

697,350

Fresh produce markets

9.6

4,751

489,364

4.9

16,869

826,600

Direct from farms

9.6

8,875

905,270

1.2

14,708

176,500

Direct from factory

7.4

32,216

2,545,050

8.2

11,924

977,800

South African informal sector
enterprises

5.5

1,956

115,391

3.2

5,391

172,520

Non-South African informal
sector enterprises

3.2

1,607

54,650

6.7

13,246

887,500

Other sources

5.1

3,486

188,250

4.6

10,838

498,525

Source

There is a common assumption that other strategies adopted by refugees give them a
strong competitive advantage over South Africans. In addition to greater business acumen
and skills, they have been viewed, inter alia, as securing discounts through group purchasing, offering credit to consumers, operating for longer hours, and selling goods more
cheaply. Statistical comparison of these, and other, business strategies indicates their relative importance to each group (Table 15). The refugees had lower odds of adjusting their
operating hours to times of the day when there were most customers, and purchasing insur26
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ance. South African migrant entrepreneurs had lower odds of operating for extended hours
(0.743) and individual bulk purchasing (0.67). Also, the refugees had two to three times
the odds of keeping business records (0.475), selling goods more cheaply than competitors
(0.395), purchasing in bulk with others (0.244), and negotiating with suppliers (0.340).
TABLE 15: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Strategies

95% C.I. for O.R.
Odds ratio

Lower

Upper

P-values
Chi-square

Fisher’s
exact test

I open my business only during the periods
of the day when I have the most customers*

1.213

1.020

1.443

0.029

0.030

I purchase insurance

1.078

0.732

1.587

0.703

0.768

I offer credit to customers

0.918

0.770

1.093

0.336

0.348

I extend my hours of operation**

0.743

0.620

0.890

0.001

0.001

I purchase stock in bulk myself**

0.670

0.562

0.800

<.001

<.001

I charge different prices for different
customers**

0.660

0.545

0.799

<.001

<.001

I look for the cheapest prices for goods by
consulting the media**

0.656

0.538

0.800

<.001

<.001

I engage in shareholding**

0.562

0.437

0.722

<.001

<.001

I keep records of my business accounts**

0.475

0.398

0.566

<.001

<.001

I look for the cheapest prices for goods by
asking other entrepreneurs**

0.439

0.367

0.525

<.001

<.001

I sell goods more cheaply than my
competitors**

0.395

0.325

0.481

<.001

<.001

I purchase stock in bulk together with
others**

0.344

0.278

0.424

<.001

<.001

I negotiate prices with my suppliers**

0.340

0.284

0.407

<.001

<.001

I look for cheapest prices for goods by
calling suppliers**

0.230

0.191

0.278

<.001

<.001

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
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The final point of business strategy comparison concerns the hiring practices of the two
groups of entrepreneurs. Almost half of the refugee entrepreneurs have employees compared to only 21% of the South Africans. The refugees in this sample provided three times
as many jobs as the South Africans. Table 16 provides statistical confirmation of the greater
FNQMPZNFOUHFOFSBUJOH QPUFOUJBM PG SFGVHFFT VTJOH PEET SBUJP  DIJTRVBSF BOE 'JTIFST
exact test calculations.
TABLE 16: Odds Ratio Calculations for Employment-Generation

95% C.I.
Variables
Currently have employees**

Odds ratio
0.273

P-values

Lower

Upper

Chi-square

Fisher’s exact
test

0.225

0.332

<.001

<.001

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs

A breakdown of employees by sex and national origin shows some differences in the
hiring patterns of the two groups (Table 17). In total, 9% of refugees hire South African
NFOGVMMUJNFBOEQBSUUJNFćFFRVJWBMFOUĕHVSFTGPS4PVUI"GSJDBOFOUFSQSJTFTBSF
8% and 4%. Refugees show a preference for hiring South African women over men with
16% employing women full-time and 4% part-time (compared to 9% and 1% for men). In
the sample as a whole, 30% are South Africans employed by refugees and 28% are South
Africans employed by other South Africans. This suggests that both refugee and South
"GSJDBOFOUFSQSJTFTDSFBUFKPCTGPS4PVUI"GSJDBOTJOSPVHIMZFRVBMOVNCFSTćFNBKPS
difference is in the employment of non-South Africans. Less than 5% of the total number
of employees are non-South Africans employed by South Africans, whereas 39% are nonSouth Africans employed by refugees.
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TABLE 17: Employment Categories of Informal Business Employees

South Africans

Refugees

Total no. of
employees

% of total
entrepreneurs

% of all
employees

Total no. of
employees

% of total
entrepreneurs

% of all
employees

South African males
(full-time)

166

8.0

10.8

145

9.1

9.5

South African females
(full-time)

172

8.0

11.2

231

15.9

15.1

South African males
(part-time)

66

3.6

4.3

16

1.1

1.0

South African females
(part-time)

29

1.8

1.9

61

4.1

4.0

Non-South African males
(full/part-time)

27

1.7

1.8

406

21.8

26.5

Non-South African females
(full/part-time)

21

1.7

1.8

194

11.9

12.6

Employee categories

COMPARATIVE SECURITY RISKS
5BCMFQSFTFOUTUIFBHHSFHBUFESFTVMUTPGUIFTFDVSJUZSJTLTRVFTUJPOGPSUIFUXPHSPVQT
of entrepreneurs. First, it is clear from the table that not every South African and refugee
respondent has been affected. This is an important initial finding because it does suggest
that most informal entrepreneurs are able to run their businesses without significant interference. This may be because of where they are located or the measures and precautions
they take to protect themselves. Second, it is clear that South Africans are not immune
from any of these risks. Nearly a third had been robbed of their stock and nearly 20% had
had income stolen. The degree of vulnerability to other security risks was much lower but
not non-existent. To this extent, therefore, South Africans in the informal sector are also
victims of crime. But there is no support here for the contention that South Africans and
OPO4PVUI"GSJDBOTBSFFRVBMMZBUSJTLPSWJDUJNJ[FE
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TABLE 18: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs

Refugees
% affected

South Africans
% affected

Prejudice against my nationality

48.0

2.2

Crime/theft of goods/stock

47.8

30.9

Crime/theft of money/income

38.1

18.5

Verbal insults against my business

34.2

7.9

Conflict with South African entrepreneurs

32.7

21.1

Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs

27.1

19.0

Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans

21.4

3.5

Harassment/demand of bribes by police

18.7

5.5

Confiscation of goods by police

14.7

6.4

Arrest/detention of entrepreneur/employees

8.5

1.4

Physical attacks/assaults by police

7.9

1.1

Prejudice against my gender

6.5

5.0

On every count, the proportion of refugees affected was higher, sometimes significantly
so. For example, 47% of refugees cited prejudice against their nationality as a risk to their
business, compared to only 2% of South Africans. Also, 34% of refugees were affected by
verbal insults against their business, compared to only 8% of South Africans. Forty-eight
percent of refugees, compared with 31% of South Africans, had been affected by theft of
their goods and stock. Similarly, 38% of refugees, compared with 19% of South Africans,
had been affected by theft of their income. Refugees reported higher levels of conflict with
South African competitors (33%) than South Africans did with refugees (19%) and with
other South Africans (21%). Interestingly, refugees also reported higher levels of conflict
with other refugee businesses (27%). The details and outcomes of such conflicts need further research, but the findings suggest that we cannot assume that refugees are a homogenous group with identical interests.
The descriptive comparisons which suggest that refugees are more likely than South
Africans to be affected by the various security risks are validated statistically in Table 19.
South African entrepreneurs had lower odds of experiencing all potential risks on the list.
Refugees were nearly three times more likely to be victims of theft of income and five times
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more likely to be subject to demands for bribes by police. The odds of a refugee entrepreneur being physically assaulted, experiencing prejudice, and being arrested and detained
were over five times higher than for South Africans.
TABLE 19: Odds Ratio Calculations for Business Problems

Odds
ratio

95%
confidence
interval
Lower Upper

Pearson
P-value
chiDf
2-sided
square

n

Prejudice against my gender

0.782 0.539 1.136

1.671 1

0.196

2051

Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs**

0.644 0.524 0.792

17.489 1

<.001

2056

Conflict with South African entrepreneurs**

0.552 0.453 0.673

34.938 1

<.001

2054

Crime/theft of goods/stock**

0.492 0.411 0.589

60.363 1

<.001

2052

Crime/theft of money/income**

0.373 0.305 0.456

95.509 1

<.001

2050

Harassment/demands for bribes by police**

0.241 0.176 0.330

88.722 1

<.001

2046

Confiscation of goods by police**

0.403 0.298 0.545

36.629 1

<.001

2047

Arrest/detention of yourself/employees**

0.179 0.105 0.303

50.513 1

<.001

2045

Verbal insults against your business**

0.167 0.129 0.216 214.406 1

<.001

2050

Physical attacks/assaults by police**

0.158 0.089 0.282

50.517 1

<.001

2052

Physical attacks/assaults by other South Africans** 0.137 0.096 0.196 150.979 1

<.001

2047

Prejudice against my nationality**

<.001

2049

0.025 0.017 0.039 577.723 1

*p<.05
**p<.01
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs

In theory, we might expect to see higher degrees of informal business security risks
for both groups in large cities such as Cape Town compared to the much smaller towns of
Limpopo (Table 20). In the case of refugees, and with the exceptions of prejudice, verbal
insults and treatment by police, Limpopo was indeed safer than Cape Town. For South
Africans, Cape Town was also a more dangerous place to run a business. For example,
56% of refugees and 31% of South Africans had experienced theft of goods in Cape Town.
*O-JNQPQP UIFFRVJWBMFOUĕHVSFTXFSFBOE BNVDIMPXFSTQSFBEUIBOJO$BQF
Town. In both locations, however, the risks are significantly higher for refugees than South
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Africans. Indeed, refugees in Limpopo were less secure than South Africans in both Limpopo and Cape Town. Theft of goods had affected 38% of refugees in Limpopo compared
with around 30% of South Africans in both Limpopo and Cape Town. Also, 31% of refugees
in Limpopo had experienced theft of money compared with 12% of South Africans in Limpopo and 26% in Cape Town. Some 19% of Limpopo refugees had experienced physical
assaults or attacks compared with 2% of South Africans in Limpopo and 7% in Cape Town.
TABLE 20: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs by Location

Cape Town
Refugees
% affected

Limpopo

South
Africans
% affected

Refugees
% affected

South
Africans
% affected

Prejudice against my nationality

47.2

3.6

47.6

1.1

Crime/theft of goods/stock

56.2

30.9

38.3

30.4

Crime/theft of money/income

43.8

25.7

31.3

11.8

Verbal insults against my business

32.1

9.0

35.3

6.9

Conflict with South African entrepreneurs

34.5

20.3

30.2

21.4

Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs

27.9

15.7

25.6

22.1

Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans

23.0

5.8

19.0

1.6

Harassment/demand of bribes by police

10.5

6.6

26.2

3.9

Confiscation of goods by police

10.1

8.0

18.8

4.9

Arrest/detention of entrepreneur/employees

7.5

2.0

9.1

1.2

Physical attacks/assaults by police

6.7

1.6

8.7

1.1

Prejudice against my gender

5.8

6.8

6.9

3.5

Another common belief is that security risks are higher in informal settlements than
in other parts of the city, particularly as many of the reports of violence against businesses
come from informal settlements, which also have much higher general crime levels. To test
this hypothesis, we focused only on Cape Town and divided refugees and South Africans
into two groups according to whether they were operating in an informal or formal part
of the city (Table 21). For both refugees and South Africans, the risks are higher in informal settlements across almost all indicators. However, the difference in the degree of risk
between refugees and South Africans is significantly greater in informal settlements than it
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is in formal areas of the city. The only indicator where formal areas are riskier for both is in
the chances of having goods confiscated by the police. Since the police barely venture into
large swathes of informal settlement, this is not surprising. Refugees are slightly more likely
to experience theft of goods in the formal versus informal areas (57% versus 54%) but the
difference is small and indicates that this is a major risk for most businesses irrespective of
location.
TABLE 21: Security Risks Facing Refugee and South African Entrepreneurs in Cape Town

Formal areas

Informal areas

Refugees
% affected

South
Africans
% affected

Refugees
% affected

South
Africans
% affected

Prejudice against my nationality

44.9

1.7

53.8

6.2

Crime/theft of goods/stock

57.0

26.7

53.8

36.7

Crime/theft of money/income

41.4

19.5

50.8

34.3

Verbal insults against my business

30.1

6.8

37.9

11.9

Conflict with South African entrepreneurs

29.6

20.9

48.5

19.5

Conflict with refugee entrepreneurs

25.5

18.5

34.8

11.9

Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans

21.2

3.8

28.0

8.6

8.9

8.6

15.2

3.8

10.2

8.9

9.8

6.7

Arrest/detention of entrepreneur and/or employees

5.1

1.7

14.4

2.4

Physical attacks/assaults by police

4.8

0.7

12.1

2.9

Prejudice against my gender

5.6

4.1

6.1

10.5

Harassment/demand for bribes by police
Confiscation of goods by police

Unsurprisingly, refugees were far more likely than South Africans to say that their business operations had been negatively affected by xenophobia: 38% versus 5% (Table 22).
There are two possible reasons for South Africans being affected: first, when collective violence occurs at a particular localized settlement, it is possible that in the chaos and mayhem, South African-owned businesses may be caught up in the looting and vandalism. As
POF 4PVUI "GSJDBO PXOFS OPUFE  iXIFO UIFTF BUUBDLT TUBSU  JU CFDPNFT EJďDVMU GPS VT UP
move and every business becomes a target. Xenophobia does not only affect foreigners, it
affects everyone” (Interview, 3 March 2016). A second explanation is that there are cascad-
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ing, spillover effects on those South African small businesses with cooperative, dependent
relationships and linkages with affected migrant-operated businesses.
TABLE 22: Degree of Impact of Xenophobia on Business Operations

Refugees %

South Africans %

A great deal

18.3

1.4

To some extent

19.3

3.5

Not very much

18.4

5.7

Not at all

43.9

89.4

STRATEGIES OF SELF-PROTECTION
The dangerous and unpredictable environment in which informal entrepreneurs ply their
trade in South African cities presents serious security challenges. It is clear from the previous section that while both groups are affected, refugees are at much greater risk than South
Africans to a range of threats. There is no a priori reason why this might be the case, other
than the fact that refugees are targeted because their presence is viewed by citizens and officials as unwelcome and even illegitimate. This was certainly the view of most of the refugees
interviewed for this study who consistently identified the manifestations of xenophobia as
the major security problem they faced:
We are victims of verbal attacks by clients. They say things such as “you must
go to [your] country. Mandela is already dead. What are you doing here?”
(Interview with Congolese refugee, 25 February 2016).
Some [customers] swear at me, my customers sometimes steal from me and
when you catch them, they tell you harshly that you are a foreigner. And that
you need to go back to your country. You are always faced with difficulties when
you are a foreigner and as such you need to be patient and know how to deal
with different kinds of people. There is too much disrespect here from South
Africans because even someone who is way younger than you, they can swear
and say nasty things to you if you are a foreigner. And they tell you straight that
South Africa is their country (Interview with Somali refugee, 12 March 2016).
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If you are a foreigner, you are always affected by xenophobia. There is no way
that you can live here and not be affected. Xenophobia starts from your customer.
Some customers are very rude and if you respond, they will talk to you in their
own language and scold you and then tell you to go back [to your country]. They
have bad words for foreigners. Many times, my business was robbed when I was
in Johannesburg. It was because I was a foreigner because they rarely stole from
locals. Sometimes criminals would come to you and ask you to give them money
and they would just ask you the foreigner. Why not the local people? That is
xenophobia (Interview with Ethiopian refugee, 19 March 2016).
Xenophobia affects us all. We know who we are. We are foreigners and that
doesn’t change. Nothing changes the reality. We live under alert anytime, no
matter the set up in which we are operating in. We always know that the same
people we are dealing with can anytime become a danger to us. It is difficult to
trust any person in South Africa. The person who is with you here today, when
there is a protest and foreigners are being attacked, he will be the first to attack
you. There is no safety. I have not been attacked but I have seen other people
being attacked and it is serious. It kills your business and it can also kill you
(Interview with Congolese refugee, 25 February 2016).
Xenophobia is the most critical problem. I have been directly affected and have
been caught up in the troubles. People have harassed me a lot, just talking like
they want to kill you or to burn you or other such things. But that was when
I was in Durban. Here [Cape Town] I have not been harassed. But there are
many people who have been victims. They have been harassed and their goods
destroyed, especially when there are strikes. The people just target anything that
they can get. They are very cruel and they do not care what the owner will do to
survive (Interview with Congolese refugee, 19 February 2016).
Xenophobia affects everyone who is a foreigner. When people loot your shop
is that not xenophobia? When they chase you away from operating in an area
because you are a foreigner that is xenophobia. There is xenophobia here,
everywhere in this country. I have friends in other parts of the country, it is
xenophobia where they live. I think South Africa is the only country with such
xenophobia. I have been affected many times. When I was in Gugulethu, we
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were robbed. That was xenophobia because they were robbing foreign-owned
shops. Here I have been affected once during a strike and they took some things
from the shop. So, xenophobia is everywhere here. The community leaders do
not protect us during the strikes. Some of the leaders are at the forefront of
looting when strikes occur, so how can they help? The government must protect
us from xenophobia and crime. The police need to do their work better because
right now they are not (Interview with Somali refugee, 7 March 2016).
*OBEFRVBUFQPMJDFQSPUFDUJPOBOEGBJMVSFUPSFTQPOEXIFOSFGVHFFCVTJOFTTFTBSFVOEFS
attack deepens exposure to security risks. A Congolese refugee said that the only recourse
BWBJMBCMFXBTUPiSVOBXBZwBTUIFiQPMJDFIFSFJOTVDIJOTUBODFT UIFZEPOUQSPUFDUVT CVU
instead abuse us” (Interview, Cape Town, 5 March 2016). Others displayed similar distrust
of the police because of perceptions of bias:
The police are not very helpful. If you have a case against a South African, they
will always side with the South African. So, it’s a waste of time to report a case
against a South African (Interview with Congolese refugee, 24 February 2016).
How accurate are these perceptions of South African hostility towards refugee businesses and business owners? A 2010 SAMP national survey of South African citizens found
that only 20% were in favour of making it easier for migrants to establish small businesses
and for migrant traders to buy and sell.27 Only 25% felt that refugees should be allowed to
work in South Africa. A similar proportion said that they would take part in actions to prevent migrants operating a business in their neighbourhood, 15% that they would combine
with others to force migrants to leave, and 11% that they were prepared to use violence
against them. Over 55% agreed with the proposition that migrants were victims of violence
because they did not belong in South Africa. Only 36% said that refugees should always
enjoy police protection and 25% that they should never enjoy protection.
A number of studies have suggested that to lower the risks of victimization, migrants
should adopt various measures to protect themselves and their employees.28 This survey
sought to establish how common some of these strategies are and whether they are also
adopted by South Africans (Table 23). One of the most common strategies is risk-sharing
by partnering with other businesses. Nearly a third of refugees and 17% of South Africans
adopt risk-sharing through partnership. Staying overnight on business premises (often a
modified container) is a strategy pursued by both groups but, again, by more refugees (19%
versus 9% of South Africans). There have been several high profile shootings of robbers by
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refugees under attack but this survey found that only 6% keep weapons for self-protection.
Other strategies (pursued by less than 10% of refugees and 5% of South Africans) include
paying security guards, and paying protection money to the police or community leaders.
Around 5% of both groups purchase insurance. Table 24 analyzes if the differences between
the refugees and South Africans are statistically significant. With the exception of paying
for insurance, refugees were far more likely than South Africans to adopt strategies of selfprotection. Refugees were five times as likely to pay for protection and twice as likely to
sleep on their business premises and to partner with others to distribute risk.
TABLE 23: Self-Protection Strategies Used by Informal Sector Entrepreneurs

Refugees %

South Africans %

I partner with other businesses to distribute risks

31.0

17.4

I sleep on my business premises

18.8

8.7

I pay for security guards

7.3

1.9

I keep weapons for self-protection

5.8

4.0

I pay the police for protection

5.5

1.0

I purchase insurance

5.1

5.5

I pay community leaders for protection

2.5

0.6

TABLE 24: Odds Ratio Calculations of Business Strategies

95% C.I. for O.R.

P-Values

Odds
ratio

Lower

Upper

Chisquare

Fisher’s
exact test

I purchase insurance

1.078

0.732

1.587

0.703

0.768

I keep weapons for self-protection*

0.648

0.430

0.976

0.037

0.039

I partner with other businesses to distribute risks**

0.470

0.382

0.579

<.001

<.001

I sleep in my business premises**

0.411

0.315

0.537

<.001

<.001

I pay for security guards**

0.245

0.148

0.405

<.001

<.001

I pay community leaders for protection**

0.222

0.091

0.543

<.001

<.001

I pay the police for protection**

0.180

0.094

0.347

<.001

<.001

* p<.05 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
** p<.01 on both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact test
Note: Odds ratios measure change in odds from refugee to South African entrepreneurs
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Various other strategies emerged during the in-depth interviews although it is not
known how common these are. For example, some refugees said that they hire South Africans to assist in communication with customers and also because it reduces their vulnerability to violence. In addition to paying protection money to police and community leaders,
refugees in one part of Cape Town regularly pay protection money to the local taxi association. The taxi association then uses this to extort money from South Africans in the area
too. Others make sure that they do not keep all their stock on the business premises out of
fear that they will be cleaned out during looting or confiscation of goods by the police. Still
others open for business only when they know that the police are not patrolling.

CONCLUSION
This report set out to systematically compare the informal enterprises established by different categories of migrant in South African urban areas. This comparative analysis of
refugees and internal migrants suggests that there is a need for much greater nuance in
policy and academic discussions about the impact of refugee migration on the South African informal economy. The stereotyping of refugees in public discourse as undermining
and destroying South African competitors is clearly far removed from the reality. While
refugees seem able to access greater amounts of start-up capital (although neither they nor
South Africans can access formal bank loans), both groups seem able to grow their businesses. Partly this is because they tend to occupy different niches in the informal economy
with South Africans focused more on the food sector and refugees on services and retailing household goods. This may help to explain another difference between the two with
refugees tending to patronize wholesalers for their supplies and South Africans purchasing
from supermarkets and fresh produce markets.
The idea promulgated by the Minister of Small Business Development that refugees
IBWFBDPNQFUJUJWFBEWBOUBHFXJUIFOUSFQSFOFVSTIJQiJOUIFJSCMPPEwJTDMFBSMZGBMMBDJPVT
South Africa’s refugee legislation and restrictive employment policies mean that working
for, and then establishing, an informal enterprise is virtually the only available livelihood
option. But to argue that all refugees come to South Africa with a pre-existing skill and
business experience is misplaced. Instead, refugees (like small business owners everywhere) are extremely motivated, hard-working and dedicated. They employ several business strategies to achieve monetary success although business expansion is hampered by
the fact that only a portion of profits can be reinvested in the business, with the rest used to
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support dependants in South Africa and their home country. These strategies are not illegal
PSFWFOVOEFSIBOEFE CVURVJUFUSBOTQBSFOUBOEDPVMECFFNVMBUFE"OEUPTVHHFTU BTUIF
minister also did, that South African migrants are poor business people is just as fallacious.
While it is true that the odds of refugees pursuing a particular strategy, such as giving goods
on credit, are generally higher than South Africans doing so, this does not mean that no
South Africans pursue the strategy, as many clearly do. Instead of constantly pitting refugees against South Africans as the official mind likes to do, it would be more productive to
treat them in policy terms as a single group attempting, often against considerable odds,
to establish and grow small businesses in a hostile or indifferent economic and political
environment.
This report has also undertaken a comparative risks assessment and vulnerabilities
analysis for refugee and South African entrepreneurs operating small business ventures in
the informal economies of Cape Town and various towns of Limpopo province. The results
show that while both groups are exposed to several risks concurrently, refugee enterprises
are far more vulnerable and overexposed. The social and structural insecurity experienced
by refugee entrepreneurs is unambiguous from several key findings. Despite operating in
the same localized environment and under similar conditions, this group encounters a
NPSFDIBMMFOHJOHTFUPGIVSEMFTBOEPOBNPSFGSFRVFOUCBTJTćFHFOFSBMFČFDUPGPQFSating small businesses in the informal economic sector does make business owners of all
kinds vulnerable, but this alone cannot explain the greater vulnerabilities of the refugee
DPIPSU*OTUFBE YFOPQIPCJBBOEUIFJSTUBUVTBTiPVUTJEFSTwBEETBOPUIFSMBZFSPGSJTLTGPS
such operators. Limited access to police protection and mistreatment by officers only exacerbates this insecurity.
What is also evident is that the majority of refugee operators have not, to date, been
affected by a range of potential risks. In part, this may be because of the mitigation strategies that they adopt. As refugee and migrant communities grow in South Africa, the emergence of individuals who are able to mitigate common risks and build their enterprises successfully is to be expected. But rather than treating these achievements with suspicion and
negativity, as government tends to do, greater attempts need to be made to harness these
productive capacities for the growth of local informal, entrepreneurial economies. These
successes are not an abnormal development nor particularly driven by unfair advantages or
JMMJDJUQSBDUJDFT6MUJNBUFMZ DPNQSFIFOTJWFOBUJPOBMBOEMPDBMJ[FETUSBUFHJFTBSFSFRVJSFEUP
develop and support informal entrepreneurship and small business growth in South Africa.
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This report compares the business operations of over 2,000 South Africans and
refugees in the urban informal economy and systematically dispels some of the
myths that have grown up around their activities. First, the report takes issue
with the perception that South Africans are inexperienced and unmotivated
participants in the informal economy. Many have years of experience and have
successfully grown their businesses. Second, it contests the view that refugees enjoy
a competitive advantage because they come to South Africa with inherent talent
and already honed skills. On the contrary, over 80% of those surveyed had no prior
informal sector experience and learned their skills on the job and after coming to
South Africa. Third, the report shows that there is fierce competition in the urban
informal sector between and within the two groups. However, business competition
between refugees and South Africans is mitigated by the fact that they tend to
dominate different sections of the informal economy with South Africans dominant
in the food sector and refugees in the household products and personal services
sectors. Finally, the report takes issue with recent arguments that all informal sector
businesses are equally at risk from robbery, extortion and other crimes. It shows
that South Africans are affected but that refugees are far more vulnerable than
their South African counterparts. The report therefore confirms that xenophobia
and xenophobic violence are major threats to refugees seeking a livelihood in the
informal sector, especially if they venture into informal settlements.

